Abstract

West Asia in its entirety is undergoing a transformation. These times have been well defined and reiterated by various scholars. West Asia’s fundamental architecture is passing through defining times. The pace of these changing geopolitical structures is triggered by domestic transformations and the extra-regional alliances. The United States (US) vision for the region was essentially defined by security structure, which is manifesting itself in security engagements and wider presence in the region through military bases across the area. Though oil driven, the American association with the region has been an interplay of dynamic factors that underlined security of its sphere of influence. Another major US policy in the region includes US aid and support to its various allies like Israel in the region. Particularly, in the last decade, bold steps were taken by the US Administration to release the deadlock. Some of the initiatives such as the JCPOA or the Abraham Accords, were tough decisions and would cause disruption in an already fragmented regional sectarian profile. The article argues that the US’s policy towards the region is changing and is apparently failing in many facets. In this article, historical facts and evidence of the US policy in the region has been put across, where at times it has created a space for dialogue between the region and itself, and at times show signs of departure.

The positioning of modern-day West Asia was prime as it connected the West with the British colonies in Asia. With cultural diversities, West Asia stands apart. The region has five major languages-Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, Kurdish, and Turkish; which is diverse and many other languages. Apart from the sectarian dimension of Shia – Sunni, lingering crisis in Yemen and Libya, the Israeli – Palestinian issue, and oil politics; West Asia also faces the Kurdish movement, where Kurds are present across Turkiye Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Since the onset of Arab Spring protests in 2011, the region has witnessed increased foreign interventions as well as rising conflicts, regime change and refugee crisis. These issues have hampered the regional growth and compromised the West’s interests in the region. The region being at the center point of US and European interests, the geopolitical storm has put the latter’s vital interests in risk. Apparently, the security and engagement of the region was an important aspect of the British and later the United States.

Obama, Trump, and Biden and their policies in West Asia

The practical and military equations led the decisions at the White House. However, the leadership personality did impact some decisions. The US forces were withdrawn from Iraq in 2011 under the Obama Administration, which injured the Iraqi social spirit, fragmenting it politically. The US occupation has already altered the political-sectarian equations in Iraq, thus indirectly empowering Shia parties and thus indirectly aided expanding Iranian influence in Iraq. The sanctions which marginalised Iran put it through tougher situations. Furthermore, the sanctions have been reimposed from time to time, due to Iranian stance. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 was created by President Obama along with a few European countries1. It restricted the expansion of the nuclear programme and gave Iran some relief over sanctions. It was clear that the overall personality of Obama helped in projecting leniency towards Iran. Iran’s sovereignty and open prospects of business for Iran, apart from disfiguring its nuclear ambitions were major considerations. These tough initiatives distorted the Saudi – US relations, which had the potential to destabilise the regional balance.

President Trump came from a different setup of bureaucracy. A business mind that deployed finance and deals as a frontliner. It was made purposefully clear that the rationale behind the U-turn over JCPOA was indicative of America's closeness to the Kingdom. The Trump administration was instrumental in dismantling the agreement, while selling arms to the region particularly Saudi Arabia worth billions of dollars2. Trump's attitude towards Iran also depended on Israeli antipathy to the Iranian regime which aided a network of Anti-Israeli proxy groups across the region. The US elections and the coming of Joe Biden to power was an indication of leadership that would follow the footsteps of its predecessor President Obama, who had a reasonable approach towards Iran and someone who would not like the US military presence in the region. The relationship is fractured as the Biden administration pulled out its troops from Yemen, a Saudi led war. Followed by the Khashoggi killings and Washington’s reaction has created a trust deficit between the alliance.

Followed by the events in the last decade, the American influence is on a decline. Various observers of regional politics as well as the global energy market point to another important factor which denotes reduced US interest in the region, it was a changing energy mix. Since world wars, US economic recovery was dependent on cheap and stable oil supply which was ensured by a network of Pro-US countries in the region. Since 2015, the advancements in Shale Gas fracking3 in the US began challenging oil dominance and indirectly influenced US interests in the wider region. While the threat was realised by oil producers and they interfered in pricing to discourage the massive production of Shale gas, it shows how the energy dynamics in influencing the policy of a great power towards the region.

Trump’s policy oscillated from his predecessor’s. While predicting the equation and fault – lines that underline the region’s geopolitical framework. The end of Iran’s nuclear deal made a clear shift from the earlier channel of dialogue between Tehran and Washington. The agreement that was supposed to facilitate and spin the wheels of growth for Iran, had hit a fundamentally strong rock-bottom that was difficult to revamp. The US administration had made its stand clear, aligning with Saudi Arabia and other GCC; and, basically avoiding any nuclear ambitions in the region, particularly Iran. This distinction between liked and disliked was very apparent for President Trump and his Administration, as people from select West Asian countries were banned from entering the US. One of the iconic pictures during his term was of his presidential visit to Saudi Arabia which offered Trump an experience of best welcome and warmth from the Royal family. This also pronounced a greater political engineering that mirrored its impact on the economic ties between the two. The bilateral ties between the two have focussed on trade especially defence deals, which has been mutually beneficial. In great power politics during retreat or vacuum of major powers other willing powers would try to fill this lacuna, this trend was observed when China mediated an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 20234. Unlike the history of costly military intervention of the US, Chinese presence is moreover ensured by robust economic and technological agreements with various countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.

President Trump’s agenda for West Asia was not new, but he went a step ahead in showing his friendly stance with Israel-shifting of the US embassy to Jerusalem5 being one of them. Shared economic prosperity between GCC and the US, strategic support for Israel, and a continued hostility for Iran continued to be the one liners for the US administration under the leadership of President Trump. Thus, normalization of relations with Israel by Bahrain, UAE, and Sudan was an important move during Trump’s presidency6. As others continued to privilege, the relationship with Iran was irreversible. Its support for proxies – Hezbollah and Houthi’s proved to be fatal and further restrictions were slapped on Tehran. The war in Yemen proved to be disastrous for the Saudi economy and had a negative Saudi reputation as there was a humanitarian crisis and massive destruction in Yemen. Trump had been supportive of MBS all along. Relations only worsened with General Qassem Soleimani’s assassination in Baghdad and attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 that corresponded into a fatal geopolitical environment, where any kind of reconciliation was remotely impossible. President Trump realised that Qatar hosted the US Al Udeid naval base and was strategically important for the US, thus Washington began to bring the two GCC members Saudi Arabia and Qatar under reconciliation. Qatar being a small state in the region which punches its influence higher by various means like its media Al-Jazeera as well as its closeness with Muslim Brotherhood. Like Saudi Arabia, Qatar also engaged in various high stake economic deals7 with the US to keep its influence in the US. While recently there are moves in US domestic politics to ban organisations like Muslim Brotherhood8 and most of the GCC regimes also share a view of Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to regime stability and social harmony. Once patronised by various GCC monarchies, now the Brotherhood is viewed as a threat by major countries like UAE.

Role of Oil in regional economies and importance of Connectivity Projects

The regional countries have historically been dependent on oil revenues, thus the turmoil in the region is also linked with energy apart from other issues like sectarianism or interventions by domestic or foreign actors. West Asia contracted global interests due to its economic relevance-the pearl industry, and date farming. However, oil became an important commodity and was responsible for the West for having a strategic design in the region. The formation of regional organizations like the Arab League or the GCC addresses the idea of security, though these have not been able to provide any kind of sustainable security in the region.

Conflict ridden West Asia and its inability to ensure its own protection, which communicates the relations between the region and the Western allies. The hostility between the regional actors continues. Thus the region continues to look for an alternative security provider, that is the US. There are common areas of economic convergence between the region and the West. Commerce and investment is enhanced by connectivity. The region lies between various rich and resource rich regions like the EU, Asia and Africa. Thus many planned corridors criss-cross the region. One of the major corridors which is also supported by the US include IMEEEC9 (India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor) which came under intense discussion in recent years. There are other planned corridors and connectivity projects like Grand Faw Project10 and the Middle corridor11. The struggle for supremacy between Riyadh and Tehran has further created a rift between the countries in the region. In the last decades, namely post 2010’s witnessed the deleterious impacts of Saudi-Iran proxy war in the region, which resulted in conflicts across the region from Syria to Yemen often destroying local communities and affecting the entire region. Far from a Saudi-Iran bipolarity, the region has competing influence from other middle powers with their own aspirations and zones of influence across the region. This includes countries like the United Arab Emirates and Turkiye which have carved their zone of influence over a wide region like Syria, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Horn of Africa. Such actions of these countries often have indirect US and Western support when it aligns with their strategic objectives.

The Saudi – US relations were built on the dynamics of oil for security agreement. From 1945 with Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Trump administration over 76 years of relations; the two have been in close quarters and stood by each other as a traditional alliance, is undergoing rapid change as major thaws have emerged in this bonhomie. Biden’s approach towards West Asia was to impose Human Rights in the region. Since, beginning US’s interference in the region was to promote democracy and human rights. The US administration looked into the undemocratic and totalitarian regimes in West Asia. President Biden who took office in January 2021 in addition to the Secretary of State Antony Blinken, took the idea further especially in the case of Saudi Arabia due to the Khashoggi killings. As West Asia dealt with other challenges, the US also brought Israel into the West Asian fold through I2U212. The US during the Biden administration had been focussing on West Asian people and its rights, which can be seen by the withdrawal cases of US troops in 2011 (from Iraq) and 2021 (from Afghanistan).

The policy framework under the Biden regime is also struggling to keep up with the health issues within the US after the COVID Pandemic. Conflict in Yemen which was initiated by Saudi Arabia also exhibits the US involvement although it has tried to exit the Yemen crisis and bring tangible results to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, the US exited from the JCPOA imposing new sanctions on Iran using pressure tactics to make Iran comply. West Asia is also home to the power dynamics of extra-regional powers-notably the US, Russia, and China. The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011 leverages Russia and China for its enduring stance in the region. The perceived US inaction during the 2019 Houthi attack13 in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates disrupting their oil supplies showed the limits of US power in the region during a crisis. This also demonstrates how with the proliferation of modern weapons like drones and Ballistic Missiles with Non-State Actors like Houthis has imposed more costs on powers like the US in their intervention in the region. In terms of trade and investment, countries like China are now more deeply engaged in the region. This is strengthened by Chinese advancements in various technologies like Artificial Intelligence and 5G, so that regional countries compete for Chinese investment and technology. Conceptually the world has moved away from the traditional factors of geopolitics. The geopolitically pertinent factors such as the fall of regimes, popular protests and small states dilemma have been pitched. The autonomy is forfeited by the interplay of power and identifying regions for promotion of influence.

How the regional politics altered post 2023 October 07

The region witnessed a big turn in 2023 October 07 with the Hamas attack on Israel14 which shocked the entire region. In the preceding years, Israel was being mainstreamed to the region and integrated into the political-security network of the wider region on the behest of the US.

A web of alliances and groupings was in formation including various GCC countries and Israel. Various countries in the region were making little overt and more covert dealings with Israel. Palestinian issue was sidelined in this wider transformation. This trend witnessed a sudden challenge post October 07, since the Israel-Palestine issue was again in debate and at least in public discourse in the wider region. While various regimes ban public protests fearing Arab spring like results, they still can't totally avoid any public reaction against open embrace of Israel amidst the ongoing war in Gaza which has turned disproportionate considering the huge loss of lives in Palestinian side. There were various reports of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel and possibilities of open relations between them, but the issues after October 07 stymied such diplomatic arrangements and Saudi Arabia was on backfoot. Thus an unexpected crisis from the actions of Hamas, a Non-State Actor in the region prevented grand plans of US and its allies in the wider region. The war had wider ramifications which did not stay strictly in the region of West Asia. The region which borders West Asia and Horn of Africa, namely Red Sea, began feeling the impacts of this ongoing conflict. Houthis aka Ansar Allah, the Shia rebel group which controls a vast region in Yemen entered the conflict in solidarity with Palestine. Armed with missiles and drones, Houthis imposed an Area Denial /Anti Access in the Red sea, often targeting merchant shipping15 which is linked with Israel. This created a logistics bottleneck in the region through which billions worth of trade traversed. This created a shipping crisis in the Red Sea akin to disruption during the Suez War many decades ago. The security issues around the Red Sea effectively challenged the western led security order which dominated the region since the construction of Suez Canal. The US responded by security missions aimed at targeting and degrading Houthi offensive capabilities but it was having limited participation considering the smaller number of regional countries involved in the “Operation Prosperity Guardian16”.

While the October 07 incident started a new war which showed limits of US power, the war in its progression witnessed degradation of capabilities of long discussed “Axis of Resistance” of Iran. The various groups in the axis including Hamas and Hezbollah experienced terrible losses. The destruction of the huge command chain of Hezbollah is commendable considering the Mossad penetration to their supply chain and subsequent operation of explosion of pagers which imposed a huge cost on Hezbollah leadership17. Prominent members including once Charismatic Hassan Nassarallah is a casualty18 shows the deeper losses taken by Hezbollah. The position of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics has also taken a hit with its dismal performance in this conflict. Hamas has also taken huge losses considering the loss of its leadership including Sinwar etc. Gaza, far from a highly armed enclave during Hamas rule, has taken huge losses from the war with millions of Palestinians losing lives and livelihood. Gaza now remains almost depopulated due to the huge destruction and awaits international assistance for reconstruction. Surprisingly this moment also demonstrated the influence of US and its various allies in the region as it was US spearheaded efforts including organisations like Gaza Humanitarian Foundation19 (GHF) which was involved in humanitarian relief in the strip and any post war reconstruction plans of Gaza expects generous donations from wealthy GCC member countries.

Syria which remained in deep sectarian conflict and foreign intervention almost since the 2011 onset of Arab spring protests witnessed sea change during the last few years. For almost a decade the Assad regime was sustained by the intervention of Russia and Iran. Syria remained a critical node of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance" and Syria hosted important Russian bases in the region. While the US and its various allies were assisting various efforts for a regime change in the country, it remained stalled due to the Russian and Iranian role in Syria. This witnessed a change in 2024, where in the months of December a blitskrieg move by once proscribed group HTS led by Ahmed Al Sharaa captured power in Damascus20. Regime change finally occurred in Syria and it was aided by various regional powers like Turkiye and Assad fled to Russia. Post regime change and its confusion, Israel conducted air operations in Syria to degrade Syrian Anti Aircraft defence capabilities21 in order to make the new regime harmless in its strategic perspective. This finally exposed the limits of Russian and Iranian intervention in a region where they enjoy limited support among the wider population considering the sectarian and other demography. This event again demonstrated the robustness of US and allies to calibrate their relations, as the US under Trump tries to maintain good relations with the Julani regime in Syria22. Israel, the major ally of the US, is believed to enjoy covert ties with the Julani regime as well as sending feelers to various groups like Druze in Syria in order to create its own security buffer in the region.

Israel, one of the major US allies in the region has emerged bruised but resilient since the war in Gaza in 2023. It has faced high losses including loss of lives and economic loss. It has eliminated top leadership of militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and has degraded the capacity of Iranian “Axis of resistance”. The regime change in Syria has also acted in favour of Israel. While it faces many domestic issues including rising political protests as well as other domestic issues like Haredim hesitation to expansion of compulsory military service. Israel has long created technological wonders in various fields including military and it is again manifested with Israeli testing of Laser weapons which can destroy drones and aircrafts23. It represents a technological leap and it will be a disruption in emerging drone warfare in the region. The US remained a firm supporter of Israel during the ongoing war despite the various protests in the US. The US is also poised to play a major role in future reconstruction of Gaza along with its various regional partners. The domestic politics of Israel is highly opinionated to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state after this war. While many Arab countries including Saudi Arabia maintain a stand of recognition of Israel after the creation of Palestinian state and this shows potential roadblock to long term regional peace. While the US under Trump remains a firm supporter of Israel and Zionist cause, recent surveys in the US denote a changing attitude towards Israel among the youth. The opposition to war in Gaza could be gauged in domestic politics of the US by the recent election of Anti-war stand politician Mamdani in the New York mayoral race. In the age of live telecasting of war and its huge human cost, this shows the changing public perception on long term military engagements24. Various actions of Israel sometimes create issues for the US in the region and it could be observed after the Israeli strike in Qatar in 2025 which challenged the US security umbrella in the wider region.

Turkiye, a major middle power in the region which is also a NATO member, figures in US security and other calculations in the wider region and its connection to other regions. In terms of connectivity, Turkiye has a major role in the much discussed “Middle Corridor” which skips highly sanctioned countries such as Iran and Russia, both adversaries of the US. Turkiye is also an important transit country for Azerbaijani gas to Europe25 thus potentially reducing Russian leverage. There are also various reports of Turkish-US-Western collaboration in central Asia to challenge current Russian-Chinese duopoly in the region. The role of Turkiye is important in case of talks in the Russia-Ukraine crisis and other aspects of Black Sea. While Trump and Erdogan share special bonhomie and other areas of US-Turkiye collaboration is Syria which witnessed a successful regime change a year ago. While the US courts the Julani regime despite its worst human rights record, Turkiye is poised to keep high influence in Syria by various means.

Relationship and Security Premise

Since the end of the second world war, this region has featured in the minds of US strategic planners as a region which ensures regular supply of oil. This demands US presence to secure key oil fields as well as US naval presence to ensure smooth trade and maritime traffic in the important Sea Lanes of Communication. US presence is well assisted by a set of allies in the region which are in turn supported by the US. As per US strategic mapping, this region is included in US Central Command26 which also includes Central Asia. US presence in this region is bolstered by a number of military bases including Army, Naval and Air bases which host thousands of soldiers and US military hardware wired for immediate deployment across the region. Any security presence and role is ensured by political will to interfere and compared to other powers, the US has well demonstrated it across various time periods across various regions with different end results. While the US faces increasing threats from countries like Iran which use its proxies to create threats to the long held western security system as seen from issues like the Red Sea crisis. While Russia once posed a threat when it was strong in Syria, this changed since the regime change in Syria last year. Thus Russia lost its presence in the region. While China is stepping up its presence by way of security cooperation, it is less inclined to interventions as carried out by the US in the region.

How India and Pakistan feature in US grand strategy in the region

In view of US strategists, Af-Pak region encompassing wider Afghanistan and Pakistan is included in Central command which include the west asian region. Since the cold war, Pakistan as a US ally has factored in the US calculations in the region. Pakistan has historically offered its security services in the service of various GCC countries.

The recent Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence deal27 remains a manifestation of the relations. Asim Munir the military chief of Pakistan is close to President Trump and with other countries like Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Pakistan security deal in such a perspective fit well with the larger US security objective in the region and Pakistan under Asim Munir is playing its cards to keep Trump satisfied. While this has created discomfort in Indian policy makers, it reminds India about the need for strategic autonomy. Pakistan also factors as one of the potential countries in the planned International Stabilization Force (ISF) planned to be deployed in Gaza28. This demonstrates that Pakistan will factor positively in US strategies in the west Asian region for the coming period.

India-US relations have deepened in the last decade. Due to its favourable geographical location India factors in US strategic calculations in various regions such as West Asia as well as the Indo Pacific region. Under previous governments such as Biden, the US tried to integrate India into the wider regional trade, connectivity and security settings. This was demonstrated in US led groupings such as I2U2 (India-Israel-US-UAE) which aimed cooperation across wider fields like economy, technology etc. The attempts to regional integration with India is seen in the IMEEEC (India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor) which could boost economic growth and create jobs in India. This can create connectivity among South Asia, GCC and EU which are large economic blocs. India’s growing closeness with Israel also suits India’s relation with the US in the wider region. Still there are certain issues which also prevent forever close cooperation and which creates mutual suspicion. US unilateral interventions and sanctions are not always endorsed by India which maintains its own strategic autonomy. This could be seen by how US sanctions affected Indian planned investments in countries like Iran. Another factor is US closeness to Pakistan which plays a subsidiary role in the region.

Conclusion

The US still plays a major role in the west Asian region. It uses various instruments of power such as political relations, economic investments as well as military interventions to maintain its core interests in the region. While it is supported by a set of regional partners which include NATO and Non-NATO allies. Various economic arrangements maintained the influence of the US dollar as a powerful currency in the world. While US interventions have sometimes played out positively as we saw in Kuwait, it also has destroyed social fabric in countries as we saw in Iraq which was a costly military intervention. While in recent years many other powers like China have increased their engagement in the region. The US has felt a fatigue owing to its military adventures and domestic debates around the futility of such interventions. Still by virtue of its high influence and hard power, the US remains the foremost power in the region. Many of the regional regimes and its ruling elites have deep economic stakes in the US and West and thus share many common interests. Its influence in the region in the larger future depends on its domestic political discourse and how it manages its relation with its regional partners.

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