Abstract

The civil war in Yemen, raging for more than a decade now, is widely considered one of the most ferocious conflicts in recent history. The unprecedented scale of casualties, resulting from fierce battles amongst the leading powers of the region has ravaged the nation. With the recent developments on this front, it becomes paramount to analyse the origins of these clashes, document the progress of this war and what it portends for the future. This paper delves into these aspects while also exploring how the history of the Gulf state, its fractured polity, tribal loyalties and terrorist movements have influenced this fractious infighting. It briefly touches upon the history of the nation, how it acquired its current form, the evolution that it underwent and the armed conflict which has engulfed it. It also depicts the impact that proxy conflicts between various powers have had on the nation. The research shows the debilitating effects that this catastrophe has had on the populace and the exploitation of this situation by non-state actors like terror organisations in the fulfilment of their objectives. It also attempts to review the existing situation and chart a possible path towards the future.

Introduction

Yemeni history dates back millennia, with certain accounts delineating a past going back to about 2000 BCE, when the nation's Hamitic population was vanquished by the south moving Semites, which displays the rudimentary development of agriculture, irrigation and domestication of animals like the camel (MEI, 1963). Despite a brief period of Egyptian conquest, Yemen largely remained under local rule. Notwithstanding this, a genetic mapping of Yemenis reveals the presence of Arabic and Levantine genomes in them, making a case for an Arabic migration into the country far preceding that of the African one (Henschel et al., 2024). This history reveals also the fact that Yemen has scarcely ever been a united state in the strict sense of the term though this lack of unity never impeded it from achieving prosperity (Megalomattis, 2008). The pre-independence history of Yemen and the despotic rule of Imam Yahiya and Ahmed in the north till 1962 depict a country in churn and desperate to emerge from the darkness of oppression (al Subari, 2017). The country is ethnically diverse with the Zaydi Shias and Shafi Sunnis present largely in the north and the south of the nation respectively (Burrowes, 1991). Another major divide was between the Zaydi Imamate in the North, formerly influenced by the Ottomans and the British administered Aden protectorate in the South established in 1839 (Stookey, 1978 & UN foundation, n.d.). So intense was the Shia-Sunni divide in the region that the Saudis came perilously close to an open conflict with the Zaydi Imamate under Imam Yahiya (al Rasheed, 2002). However, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom under Yahiya, his son Ahmed and grandson Mansur Muhammad al-Badr sustained only till 1962 when the revolutionary fervour that had arisen in West Asia swept away this regime, notorious for its divisive and stringent policies (Rabi, 2015).

The 1962 revolution and the Cold War:

On the 26th of September 1962, Imam Badr and the decades old theocratic regime were both toppled in a military coup similar to the Free Officers’ Movement of Egypt led by Nasser (Clark, 2010). Thus arose the Yemen Arab Republic, more commonly referred to as North Yemen, a state whose early years were occupied with the efforts to create a consolidated state in the tribal lands of the region (Burrowes, 1991). By late 1967, the British left Aden and thus was born the People's Republic of South Yemen, run by a Communist government (Clark, 2010). The Communist NLF, which governed South Yemen, aligned itself with the Soviets, with its rule being marked by large scale purges and repression (Peterson, 1981). This period reveals the fertile soil that Yemen provided for the conduct of proxy warfare on its lands. A paragon of this would be the North Yemeni civil war. As stated above, the revolutionary military regime displaced the theocratic monarchy. However, it is necessary to take into account that the military officials were backed by the Egyptians to the hilt while the royalist forces were supported by the Saudis, turning the civil war into a proxy combat between the two nations are perhaps more importantly a battle between two systems of governance in the region - religious monarchies and secular dictatorships (Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, n.d.). This phenomenon of covert conflict was exacerbated upon the intrusion of Cold War politics in this struggle for power.

The Egyptian backed revolutionaries were backed by the Soviet Union while the Saudi funded royalists were assisted by the Americans and the British (Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, n.d.). The British in fact signed off on the mercenaries which were to aid the Royalist war effort (Clark, 2010). The interventions by major powers in the Gulf nation persisted throughout the rest of the Cold War as well.

With the advent of the Communist state of South Yemen, strengthened in its socialist leanings by 1969, the two superpowers engaged in a strategic realignment in their Yemeni calculus. Thus, in the 1970s, the Soviets pivoted towards the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), while the Saudis and the Americans, recognising that the royalists were a lost cause and that North Yemen was the only bulwark against Marxism- Leninism in the Gulf, switched their support and backed the North Yemeni government (Gause, 1990). This divide symbolises the quintessential Cold War bloc politics and fluidity of alliances due to changing strategic calculations and priorities. It also establishes that Yemen, with its complex socio - religious structure, tribal society, and fragile national fabric has a proclivity for falling prey to the machinations of global powers. This historic vulnerability has been exploited even in the modern era by regional powers to expand their influence as shall be seen in the paper further.

President Saleh and the unification:

Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President of North Yemen, came to power in 1978 and continued his tenure even after the reunification of both countries in 1990, only to demit office in 2012 (Ahmed, 2019). His regime witnessed the gradual rise of political Islam as espoused by certain offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen (Rabi, 2015). This rise of Islamism, antithetical to the atheist communism of the PDRY, was encouraged by the Saudis. With their paths moving ever away from each other, it was unlikely that the much-vaunted reunification would transpire into reality any time soon. Therefore, the announcement of unification on 22nd May, 1990, took the whole world by surprise (Clark, 2010). The Sanaa Agreement reached between the two parties as a compromise at the leadership level between General Secretary al-Bidh and President Saleh was touted as historic, delivering justice to the fractured land. However, the accord having been reached as a result of significant concessions to the South, was rather hasty, ill- thought out and did not account for certain irreconcilable societal differences between the two peoples. The Saudis too, were unhappy with the Arab nationalists controlling the whole of Yemen and bankrolled an uprising against them, which failed miserably, prompting them to shelve their plans to overthrow the Saleh regime (Riedel, 2019).

Despite this overt show of unity, the fractures within the polity of the nation ran deep and resurfaced within a decade of this incident in the form of a brutal civil war in 1994. The merger of the tribal dominated North with the socialist South only created greater problems notwithstanding the veneer of stability. The civil war of the 1990s was thus more a result of competition over resources than a conflict precipitated by ideological differences (Dostal, 2021). It was also, in equal measure, a function of the internecine power conflict that had plagued the incipient government. The southerners again declared independence in a bid to blackmail the government, but failed in face of northern fire (Clark, 2010). This unsuccessful attempt at achieving autonomy only served to further strengthen Salih's control over the nation and he continued consolidating power over the further decades by manipulating the electoral system.

Stagnation under the Saleh regime: The regression of democracy and the increased authoritarianism heralded an era of economic woes compounded by institutional corruption and corrosion. The burgeoning population and rising unemployment coupled with a drying up of oil revenues ended up debilitating the state coffers. Another concern, resulting from the decline of oil profits, was that they being a means to appease competing interests, pacifying these diverse groups became more difficult. These troubles eventually culminated in a number of movements which strove to cleave the country apart. Among them were the secessionists in the erstwhile South Yemen who yearned to regain independence, the Shia rebellion which arose in the province of Sa'da, named the ‘Houthi rebellion’ after their leaders- the al-Houthi family and finally the rise of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, led by Anwar al-Awlaki (Rabi, 2015 & Shane, 2015).

The undeclared prejudice against the south in terms of resource allocation, economic development, property disputes, land rights, employment etc. reflected in the deep discontent towards the government (Rabi, 2015). The overtly Islamic character of the regime ran afoul of the secular, atheist past of the region. The dismissal of southern military officers and bureaucrats only worked to retrench this feeling. The sectarian policies of Saleh, favouring members of his own Sanhan tribe and the clientelistic systems of patronage perpetrated by his regime, in a bid to obtain support from diverse societal sections, combined to exacerbate the resentment against him (Hill, 2008). The final nail in the coffin was the preparation to crown Saleh's son - Ahmed as his successor, with massive anti-government demonstrations occurring in January 2011 (Rabi, 2011).

Protests and the beginning of the civil war:

These protests, part of the Arab Spring and led by the Islamist Al Islah party, aimed at deposing Saleh. The tribes, terrorists and protestors targeted critical infrastructure in a bid to coerce the government (Albasoos & al Hinai, 2020). The civil disobedience by the protestors culminated in violence and bloodshed in March 2011, with the demonstrators demanding an end to the problems of unemployment, corruption and nepotism reflected in the dire state of public infrastructure and the concentration of oil revenues with the government (Orkaby, 2019). They finally succeeded in late February 2012 when Saleh handed power to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, his Vice President (BBC, 2012). The three-decade long Saleh rule had left the country impoverished and vulnerable, riven by conflicts and rival insurgencies. With separatist movements and terrorist elements running riot, the state was on the verge of descending into civil war. The divisions in the military did not help matters as well. Similarly concerning was the economic turmoil wrought by the IMF imposed conditions for economic recovery (Ahmed, 2019). The proverbial spark that lit the fire was the fall of the capital Sana’a in 2015 to the Houthi insurgents and the ouster of the Hadi regime (Ahmed, 2019). It was alleged that this victory was also contributed to by the cooperation of the remnants of the Saleh tribal-military nexus (Salisbury, 2016). This was the logical culmination of the waves of Houthi rebellions which had taken place since 2004. Multiple initiatives like the ‘National Dialogue Conference’ led by the Gulf Cooperation Council from March 2013 to January 2014, the appointment of a special envoy by the UN in 2015 and the passage of UNSC Resolution 2216 were all attempts to remedy the situation which failed miserably (Feirstein, 2019 & Ahmed, 2019). Even when the Houthi-Saleh axis showed no signs of stopping, the groups which rose in opposition to it were localised and devoid of a central platform to coordinate their actions. They primarily considered this as an incursion by the ‘highlanders’ into their strongholds and did not attempt to stand united behind the Hadi regime. This resulted in the country being ruled de facto by the Houthis by September 2014 with the Sana'a government reduced to being a rubberstamp especially after Hadi was placed under house arrest in early 2015 (Salisbury, 2016). This was followed shortly after by a coup with the Houthis framing a new ‘constitutional declaration’, dissolving Parliament and appointing a new Presidential Council which prompted Hadi to flee to Aden, declare it as a temporary capital and request GCC intervention by characterising the takeover as a ploy by Iran (Salisbury, 2016).

Saudi led coalition intervenes:

Hadi, forcibly banished from the capital, resisted the coup for some weeks from his palace in Aden but was coerced into leaving the country by Houthi offensives and took refuge in Saudi Arabia, rescinded his resignation and preferred to govern as a President in exile with Riyadh's support (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). This was shortly followed by a full-fledged military intervention by the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015, named Operation Decisive Storm, which aimed to restore the Hadi government by expelling the Houthis from Sana'a. This sparked a new phase in the civil war characterized by a barrage of economic sanctions and airstrikes with support from western powers, especially the USA (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). These operations have included a painful naval blockade of Iranian vessels attempting to reach the Houthis with support and thousands of airstrikes, which have killed both combatants as well as civilians. The Americans too have taken part in this conflict by intercepting weapons delivery by the Iranians to the Houthis through the naval route (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). This offensive neutralised numerous early Houthi gains in Marib and Aden and pushed them back towards their strongholds around Sana’a (Baron, 2019). The Houthis too have begun striking back with them sending waves of drones at the Saudis and the Emiratis (Wassef, 2021 & Al Jazeera, 2022).

The crisis was compounded by the rapid rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the southern and eastern parts of the nation which projected the Houthi advances as a Shia takeover of Yemen, thereby igniting sectarian conflict in a bid to rally support amongst the majority Sunnis of the nation (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). By April 2016, the UN brokered talks between the government in exile and the Houthis broke down (Al Jazeera, 2016). Eventually this prompted the formation of a new political council by the Houthi-Saleh combine to govern the areas controlled by them (Reuters, 2016).

Heightened conflicts ensue:

This arrangement descended into chaos within a year and by the end of 2017, Saleh's faction had broken off from the regime, calling for an armed struggle against it (Edroos, 2017). This conflict ended quickly with Saleh killed and his forces comprehensively defeated (Alley, 2017). Saleh's forces did not surrender and instead joined hands with the Saudi coalition in the offensive which led to the fall of the crucial port of Hodeidah (BBC, 2023). The Stockholm Agreement sponsored by the UN in 2018 failed to resolve the conflict as well (Dashela, 2024). In 2021, the Houthis launched offensives to take Marib, a government stronghold and this led to deadly clashes between the two forces (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). In 2022, Hadi resigned after a decade in power, paving the way for a seven-member Presidential Council with Rashad al Alimi as chair (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). The 2022 UN mandated ceasefire lapsed in October that year without any extensions (Alghobari and Mokashef, 2022). Peace talks resumed again in 2023, mediated by Oman and have provided hope especially with the normalisation of relations between the Saudis and the Iranians, the two major players in the proxy civil war. The Houthis, who had been designated as a terrorist organisation under Trump, had this characterization removed under Biden in 2021, only to be reinstated by 2024, following their participation in the Israel-Hamas war and attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). The Houthis had joined the war in late October 2023 blockading the Bab el Mandeb Strait for nearly 2 years with ‘solidarity strikes’ in favour of the Palestinians and the Iranians (Motamedi, 2023). Joint US-UK strikes on the Houthis in late January 2024 only resulted in them reaffirming their resolve to persist with their campaign in the Red Sea (Kasulis C.K. et al, 2024). Similar strikes by US forces were carried out in early 2025 in a bid to deter Houthi aggression in crucial maritime shipping lanes though the group did again carry out attacks during the 12-day Iran- Israel war later that year (Salhani, 2025). The multiple weeks long bombing campaigns undertaken by the Americans and their western allies seem to have failed miserably in destroying Houthi capabilities and they thus remain the most potent Iranian proxy in the aftermath of the decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas by the Israelis. The organisation continues to wield significant capacities to disrupt global trade and harm western and Israeli interests in the region. While they have been vocal about the stoppage of their attacks being contingent on the Gaza ceasefire, it is possible that escalations in West Asia may encourage them to engage actively in the conflagration, thus bringing the Yemeni civil war back into focus in the global consciousness (Jalal, 2026).

The major actors in the Yemeni civil war:

The Southern Transitional Council (STC):

This organisation was formed in 2017 as a logical conclusion of the decades long separatist movement simmering in the southwest of the country, especially around the port of Aden (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). Long supported by the UAE, it seeks to achieve the independence of South Yemen, under the leadership of Aidarous al-Zubaidi (Anna, 2026). Though ostensibly a part of the Saudi led coalition and the Presidential Leadership Council, it had declared its intentions to achieve autonomy in 2020 itself (Saba, 2026). It was also a part of the cabinet formed by President Hadi under the Riyadh Agreement (Jalal, 2021). Since the group aims to achieve its goals through military means, it has come into conflict with southern governorates like Hadramout, leading to challenges surrounding governance, standard of living, stability etc. (Dashela, 2024). The internecine conflict in the Presidential Leadership Council and the internal battles among the STC and other groups in the South have caused serious issues for the region as a whole. The sectarianism of the Houthis coupled with the separatism of the STC has caused severe issues for the nation. Though the UAE withdrew its troops officially from Yemen in 2020, it continues to maintain its influence through the operations of the STC (Saba, 2026).

It has expanded its presence in the Hadramout and al Mahra provinces with its offensives late in 2025 and has pushed towards the Saudi border (Saba, 2026). However, the counter attacks by the Saudi led coalition has ensured the dissolution of the group with Riyadh taking indirect control of its territories (Alasrar, 2026). With recent tensions between the Gulf allies Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, the latter seems to have been bent on annihilating the STC. The December operations were perceived as inimical to Saudi interests and thus, the Kingdom descended upon the STC with a vengeance, expelling Zubaidi from the PLC, coercing the delegation sent by him for talks to announce a dissolution of the group unilaterally and charging him with high treason (Alasrar, 2026). With the STC relegated to history and its leader effectively exiled, Riyadh will have to tackle southern aspirations.

The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC):

It was formed in the aftermath of the resignation of former President Hadi in April 2022 and is an eight-member committee led by Rashad al-Alimi (Saba, 2026). The group is largely perceived to be a big tent coalition with representation provided to most factions in the conflict except the Houthis. The STC had been given 3 seats on the Council too though with its disintegration, they have been reassigned to other representatives. The PLC which is widely viewed as the internationally recognised, legitimate government of the country is a broad coalition of groups opposed to the Houthi control over Sanaa and surrounding areas. The PLC has received substantial aid from Gulf nations like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (Khoury, 2025). However, this had not materialised into any substantive gains on the battlefield since its formation in 2022 for the frontlines had remained frozen for the further three years. President al-Alimi, who governs from Aden, has overseen the functioning of a government riddled with corruption, inefficiency, lack of basic amenities and poor economic conditions. The worsening of the economy and the lack of autonomy resulted in the resignation of the PM Ahmad bin Mubarak (Agence France Presse, 2025). The newly appointed PM Salem Bin Breik has done little to alleviate these issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, 2025). Tareq Saleh, the nephew of slain former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who commands the National Resistance Forces, is also a member of the PLC and controls areas south of Hodeida and the port city of Mokha (Ali, 2025). Saleh's forces are strategically important despite their control over limited territory as they overlook the critical Bab el Mandab Strait and are aligned with the anti-Houthi coalition. This variety of forces has frequently created crises in the PLC’s functioning.

The Houthis:

This movement, frequently called Ansar Allah, triggered the civil war when it captured Sanaa in 2014. While geographically it controls lesser territory than the STC previously and the Saudi coalition currently, the areas it holds are among the most populated with about 60-65% of the Yemeni population concentrated in these areas (Saba, 2026). They are often viewed as part of the Iranian “Axis of resistance” and accused of being Iranian proxies, a claim which they refute vehemently. They control about 33% of the territory including the capital Sanaa, Ibb, Dhamar, some parts of al Hodeidah, etc. (Ali, 2025). The Houthis which had emerged in the late 1970s in Saada, were a Shia Zaydi movement which came into conflict with the Yemeni forces multiple times in the first decade of the millennium (Dashela, 2024). Their advances in the Saada governorate in 2011 ensured that they took control of swathes of territory as they moved on Sanaa (Dashela, 2024). Thus, the Houthis had already founded a state within a state in Yemen, influencing educational institutions, foisting their ideology on the masses, taking control of the administration, etc. The arms shipments provided to them by the Iranians further complicated matters with this fuelling a sanguinary war in the country, fragmented into variegated armed groups who vied for power in the Gulf nation. The Houthis aim, for instance, to create a religious state which professes Shia Islam and is ideologically opposed to the West and Israel. This movement, marshaled by the family patriarch Badr al-Din al-Houthi, has grown ever more complex over the years (Orkaby, 2019). The organisation which arose in the 1990s out of a fear of Saudi sponsored Salafism, transformed into a political party under Hussein al-Houthi with little success, eventually establishing a movement alienated from the mainstream Yemeni political circle (Orkaby, 2019). Hussein was slain in the first of the six battles between the Houthis and the al Ahmar led government forces and this lent his name to the movement. Ansar Allah has since come into conflict with the Saudi led coalition which aimed to oust it from power. Repeated drone and missile strikes against the coalition and the killing of Saleh further widened the chasm between the two (Wilson Centre, 2022).

The Iranian military assistance to the group, in violation of a UN sanctioned arms embargo was crucial in this regard (Gladstone, 2018). Despite numerous ceasefire attempts, the conflict continues to rage on more than a decade after it was first ignited (Wilson Centre, 2022). The final UN brokered truce which expired in October 2022 has largely held notwithstanding hostilities occurring post October 7, 2023 which led to heightened Houthi attacks in the light of the Hamas terror attack in Israel (Riedel, 2023). This prompted Israeli and Western retaliation with the former striking in late 2025, resulting in the demise of the Houthi appointed Prime Minister (Associated Press, 2025). Similar strikes were carried out earlier by American administrations under President Biden and President Trump (Khoury, 2025). However, tensions have ameliorated in recent months with the Houthis signing an Omani mediated truce with the Americans and the unilateral stoppage of attacks against Israel in light of the Gaza ceasefire (Khoury, 2025). The hiatus in the fighting has only served to embolden the group as it aims to rebuild the military, logistical and infrastructure capabilities degraded by years of civil war and attacks by the US and Israel (Ardemagni, 2025).

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP):

The AQAP is a terrorist organisation which was formed as an offshoot of Al Qaeda. It was established in January 2009 following the unification of the organisation's Yemeni and Saudi wings, lending it the name AQAP (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). One of its most prominent leaders was Anwar al-Awlaki, killed in an American drone strike in 2011 (Shane, 2015). The group has conducted operations against Western interests not only in Yemen but also in the heart of the West, as demonstrated by the attempted bombing on Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 (US Department of Justice, 2012). The group has also claimed responsibility for January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). In early 2010, the State Department designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation while listing al-Awlaki as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) later the same year (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). The AQAP grew more active with its operations after Saleh was deposed and this only intensified with the beginning of the civil war in 2014. The Salafist Sunni AQAP was harshly opposed to the Shia Zaydi Houthis and carried out multiple strikes against them. With the emergence of the anti-Houthi coalition, the group has escalated its terror attacks targeting both the coalition and the Houthis though there have been reports of the coalition reinforcing its ranks with former fighters of the organisation, all of which have been refuted by American and Gulf officials (Associated Press, 2018). AQAP continues to remain a potent terror threat especially in the southern and central parts of Yemen with it occupying certain pockets of territory and foisting its rule by means of armed militias (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). The group has seen its founders and later emirs being targeted by the USA with multiple strikes (Carvajal and Kelly, 2020). It remains paramount for the US to continue carrying out strikes against the group while also ensuring that the coalition backed PLC government delivers for the people, providing them with basic amenities and security, which would in turn deter the masses from viewing AQAP as a means to receive these.

Humanitarian catastrophe:

The UN Humanitarian Office has categorised Yemen as the world's ‘worst humanitarian crisis’ with its report stating that potentially 13.5 million people could be at risk of starvation and about 80% of its population could be in need of aid (Anadolu Agency, 2021). Over 377000 people are believed to have died owing to this conflict till 2021 with the UNDP stating that about 70% of these casualties would be children under 5 (Al Jazeera, 2021). Nearly 5 million people are at risk of famine (Centre for Preventive Action, 2026). The civil war and the ensuing warfare have ruined the country. The casualties have skyrocketed with no plausible end in sight. These problems have been compounded by the economic turmoil which has engulfed the nation. The depreciation of the currency, weakening of the economy and widespread poverty have led to grave consequences for the Gulf state. The fractured polity, internecine conflicts among several power brokers, terror attacks by radical non state actors and the proxy war waged by regional actors have resulted in arguably the most cataclysmic warzone in recent history. The human cost of this war continues to remain astronomical with no end in sight.

Conclusion

The Yemeni civil war is a reminder that power competition in an anarchic system is brutal and often ruins the nations involved. What began as skirmishes among groups over tribal and sectarian lines has devolved into perilous decade- long clashes sponsored by regional powers. While the nation was never really united, the forced unification in 1990, the dictatorship of Saleh, disregard for the fundamental rights of people and the flagrant violation of democracy rendered the tethering together of the nation untenable. With the recent disbanding of the STC, Saudi-UAE tensions, the conflict between Israel, USA and Iran, the weakening of the ‘Axis of resistance’, the activities of the Houthis, the strengthening of the PLC, and the resurgence of terror organisations, the civil war is far from over. Whether the stalled peace process will resume and fruition is unclear too. Therefore, it may be assumed that the Yemeni civil war will continue to rage for the foreseeable future with catastrophic ramifications for the people and the region as a whole. How the war progresses remains to be seen.

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