Abstract
The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), brokered by the World Bank between India and Pakistan, has long been regarded as one of the most resilient water-sharing agreements in modern diplomatic history. Surviving multiple wars and prolonged political hostility, the Treaty has functioned as a stabilizing mechanism in an otherwise volatile bilateral relationship. However, recent developments, including India’s decision to place the Treaty in ‘abeyance’ following renewed cross-border hostilities in 2025, have caused debates regarding its strategic, legal, environmental, and geopolitical implications to surface. This paper critically seeks to explore what the IWT entails, what it means to put a treaty into abeyance, the potential implications this could have for both India and Pakistan and the broader diplomatic and environmental consequences of such a move. It argues that while the Treaty has historically acted as a conflict-mitigating instrument, contemporary geopolitical realities necessitate a reassessment of its strategic viability. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at balancing national security imperatives with international legal obligations and environmental sustainability.
Keywords: Indus Waters Treaty; Water Diplomacy; Treaty Suspension; India-Pakistan Relations; Hydro-Politics
Introduction
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a transboundary water distribution agreement between India and Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank in the year 1960. The IWT, having been formulated & promulgated for over 6 decades, has recently garnered increased attention following the Pahalgam terror attack on 22nd April 2025 and India’s subsequent retaliation through Operation SINDOOR (Strategic Initiative for Neutralising Destructive Opponents with Overwhelming Retaliation). As part of India’s strategy to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, the Government of India announced its decision to put the IWT into ‘abeyance’.
What is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)?
The Indus basin, comprising the Indus, Ravi, Beas, Sutlej, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers, emerges in southwest Tibet. The Indus Basin enters Kashmir and flows into Punjab, eventually draining into the Arabian Sea. The IWT allows for the unrestricted use of the water of the three ‘eastern rivers’, namely the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej by India while that of the three ‘western rivers’, namely the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum flows to Pakistan. India has approximately 20% of the total share of water carried by the latter three, whereas Pakistan gets the major share, approximately 80% (PIB, 2019).
With 80% of the waters allocated to Pakistan and a meagre 20% to India, to start with, India is at a disadvantage. This unfair and asymmetric allocation raises legitimate questions, especially as to why the Government of India, at that time, agreed to such an unbalanced allocation instead of pursuing an equitable division (Down To Earth, 2023). Given the strategic importance of natural resources for the development of any nation, it is indeed a matter of scrutiny whether national interests were adequately safeguarded at the time.
Furthermore, India’s upstream position (all six rivers first flow through India and then into Pakistan) does not give it any operational advantage. India cannot capitalize on its upstream position and restrict the water flow of the western rivers due to the binding provisions of the IWT. Albeit, India does enjoy limited rights over the use of the water from the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes such as irrigation, water storage and hydropower.
Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian economy, and nearly 80% of its agriculture depends upon the water that flows from the Indus system (Singh, 2025). Thus, any kind of action by India to stop the flow of water into Pakistan may have a crippling effect on its agricultural and economic landscape (Singh, 2025). Therefore, a reliance of such nature necessitates the need for a more balanced approach with respect to water sharing; one where the interests of both nations are safeguarded equally.
The IWT has stood the test of time surviving four wars, and repeated acts of cross-border terrorism against India by Pakistan. However, a roadblock occurred in what appeared to have marked a rare moment of cooperation and goodwill between the two nations on April 23, 2025. The treaty was placed in “abeyance” for the first time following the heinous attack on Indian and foreign tourists by Pakistani terrorists in the lush meadows of Baisaran in Pahalgam (Barua et al., 2025; Bhaumik, 2025).
Hitting Pause, Literally and Legally
Abeyance denotes putting a halt on something temporarily, with temporary being the key word. It suggests a state of waiting or holding. India suggested putting the IWT into abeyance, i.e., temporarily suspending the water supply to Pakistan in order to put pressure on various factions within the Government of Pakistan to take concentrated and targeted steps to curb cross-border terrorism emanating from its land.
However, it is crucial to understand that the term ‘abeyance’ does not have any formal recognition, either in the IWT or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). India is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and although Pakistan is, it has not ratified it. It is important to note that the purview of international law does not allow nations to pause treaty obligations unilaterally, especially in the case of treaties about shared resources such as water, where cooperation is highly essential.
It has been stipulated by Articles XII (3) and XII (4) of the IWT that any amendments or termination of the treaty must be agreed upon by both India and Pakistan, something highly unlikely in the present scenario of rising tensions. Alternatively, Articles 60-62 of the Vienna Convention stipulate that countries can suspend treaties under very specific circumstances such as serious violations by the other party or if there is an incapacity to perform.
Initially, India did not invoke any of these allegations as a basis for temporarily suspending the treaty and therefore the move could be looked at as a political message and an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan rather than from a legal lens (Barua et al., 2025). In practice, this meant that by pausing cooperation, India may stop sharing information on water related projects in the western rivers (violation of Article IV and Article VIII), it might withhold flood and hydrology data that Pakistan relies on (violation of Article VI and Article VIII), and could flush silt from dams without prior notice which affects water flow and planning in Pakistan (violation of Article III(2), Article VII, and Article VIII). This would not cancel the treaty but would constitute a breach of key provisions of the IWT by India and also hurt and disrupt water management and planning in Pakistan.
The Ripple Effects for India and Pakistan
The abeyance of the treaty comes as a blessing for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (UT-J&K). If any part of India has had to directly bear the brunt of this lopsided Treaty, it has been the then state and now UT-J&K. The economy of UT-J&K is heavily reliant on agriculture but the constraints over the use of the water from the western rivers imposed by the IWT hindered irrigation projects and other advancements in the agricultural sector in the UT. The people of the region have blamed the IWT for its underdevelopment and sought the termination of the Treaty. The IWT has since been a permanent bone of contention in the Assembly. The Indus River Basin has an estimated hydropower potential of around 20,000 MW (with 16,480 MW already identified), most of which remains untapped. The main reason is the restrictions imposed by the IWT, which only permits run-of-the-river projects meaning India is constrained from building dams that would significantly alter the river’s flow into Pakistan. As a result, the state cannot fully benefit from its own natural water resources, limiting both its energy development and economic growth. Furthermore, the IWT has put the UT at the risk of regular flooding, leading to large scale loss of life, property and biodiversity. Therefore, putting the IWT into abeyance has come as a blessing for UT-J&K for more than a couple of reasons.
By holding the IWT in abeyance, India is effectively halting 39 billion cubic metres of water annually, significantly threatening the availability of water in Pakistan. A disruption in water supply, especially during the summer months will leave Pakistan parched in the heat. The Indus and its tributaries are the backbone of Pakistan’s energy industry powering hydroelectric dams like Tarbela and Mangla, which account for nearly 30% of the total electricity generated.
A disruption in the water flow will impact power generation. To put it into perspective, analysts have predicted that it could cause widespread blackouts lasting up to as long as 16 hours daily. Additionally, this would severely affect its agriculture, trade, employment, and food prices. Water scarcity will have a negative impact on industries such as sugar, rice and textile, which could potentially reduce Pakistan’s exports, thereby worsening its balance of payments situation.
On the flip side, for India, there is an increasing scrutiny over whether or not India has the infrastructural capabilities to withhold such large volumes of water, and rightly so. The Bhakra Nangal Dam on the Sutlej, Thein (Ranjit Sagar Dam) on the Ravi, and Pong and Pandoh Dams on the Beas have been constructed to use the waters of the eastern river efficiently and reap maximum benefits. However, India’s run-of-the-river hydropower plants do not possess the capabilities for large-scale storage and therefore India may consider unexplored options which could entail the redesigning of hydropower projects to increase its storage capacity and deploying drawdown flushing of its reservoirs. Releasing large volumes of water abruptly could also cause sudden flooding downstream in Pakistan. However, the National River Linking Project (NRLP) deserves a mention here. The NRLP aimed at addressing the problems of water scarcity by transferring waters from surplus river basins to water-deficient areas (PIB, n.d.). One of the two major components of the project was the Himalayan Component, which focused on linking rivers like Brahmaputra and Ganga. This intersects with the IWT because of the shared nature of several northern rivers and any attempt to interlink the rivers of the Indus basin would need prior consultation with Pakistan. Slated for completion in 2016, the project faced delays as India wanted to mobilize the necessary resources and detailed environment and feasibility studies. These steps were essential for the systematic & sustainable implementation of a project given its magnitude, impact, and strategic importance.
The IWT has also been giving rise to military constraints. Since India is permitted to use the water from the western rivers only for certain specific purposes, this limits India’s ability to use water for military operations such as building military infrastructure or diverting water for strategic purposes. Any deviations from the Treaty’s criteria could lead to disputes, affecting water availability for military and even civilian purposes.
From a geopolitical perspective, the IWT may seem to have served as a stabilizing force in the relationship of India and Pakistan, especially in the domain of water-sharing but this is far from reality. By acting as a conflict-reducing mechanism, the Treaty has prevented water disputes from blowing into full-fledged wars, even during the times of heightened hostility such as the 1965, 1971 wars as well as the Kargil War in 1999 (Yadav, 2025). Its durability has often been a textbook example of the so-called successful bilateral cooperation in the otherwise strained diplomatic relations.
However, the 2025 suspension of the IWT comes as an unprecedented shift, coming in direct response to cross-border terrorism sponsored by the Pakistani establishment, marking the first time in six decades that the Treaty has been actively suspended by one party as a form of strategic pressure. This stance by India has reaffirmed its policy of zero tolerance towards terrorism, and has gone to show that India will, if need be, take such steps in order to push Pakistan to take credible steps to curtail terror outfits and their notorious activities.
The possibility of India having to face international pressure for putting the IWT into abeyance cannot be ruled out. After all, the suspension of a long-standing treaty, that too on the sharing of water resources is bound to garner a lot of attention. However, this time India has a strong and compelling reason to justify its actions – ‘national security’. It would only be fitting if the same degree of diplomatic pressure would be put on Pakistan to dismantle the terror networks operating from its soil. The world need not take seriously, human rights concerns raised by a nation that has a documented history of sponsoring terrorism. If the international community is concerned with peace and stability across the world, it must recognize that cooperation can never be unilateral. Ignoring the cause of such extreme measures - especially state sponsored terrorism – can reinforce the notion of an imbalance status-quo. India’s move should thus be seen not as a disregard to international laws but as a medium to enforce accountability and responsibility so that the burden of peacebuilding is not shouldered unequally.
From an environmental point of view, water scarcity in Pakistan could lead to the disruptions of natural and biological ecosystems. Scarcity of water could lead to depletion of freshwater reserves, wetlands, aquatic plants and animals as well as amphibians.
It could affect migratory patterns of birds and may also lead to the loss of arable land, thereby leading to a decline in agricultural productivity. Low water levels could affect rivers’ ability to flush out industrial pollutants naturally which may cause the toxin levels in water to spike that could affect plant, animal, and human life. Overall, ecosystems may become more vulnerable to the rising threats posed by climate change.
While suspending the IWT would seem like a strategic move for India, it would have serious environmental ramifications within its own borders as well. Increased risk of floods may lead to loss of soil quality in Himalayan and riverine regions. Waterlogging, reservoir strain, and effects on seasonal agricultural cycles could be the possible repercussions of over-retention of water. Environmental concerns are often transboundary, and those arising from the suspension of the IWT will seriously hinder India’s efforts to stay true to its climate goals provided appropriate and timely measures are taken.
A Tightrope Walk: A Result of India’s Misplaced Optimism
This is not the first time that India and Pakistan have faced tensions over water sharing but never had the IWT been put under abeyance. For instance, when Pakistan raised objections over India’s Kishanganga project on the Jhelum (2010-2013), the dispute was resolved at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which allowed India to proceed with the project while ensuring minimum water flow to Pakistan. A second instance was the Tulbul Navigation Project, where India’s proposal to build a barrage on the Jhelum invited objection from Pakistan. The project has been stalled by Pakistan citing the IWT (Mohan, V., May 2025).
However, what sets this moment apart is India’s unprecedented move to do just that – sending a clear and assertive message that it will not tolerate threats to its national security and is prepared to safeguard its interests even if it means restricting Pakistan’s access to a resource as basic and vital as water. While dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), which comprises representatives from both nations have been established to manage disputes, one cannot estimate the degree to which these mechanisms will prove to be of help given the prevailing tensions between both nations. Alternatively, the IWT also provides for dispute resolution through neutral experts or by international bodies such as the World Bank.
Over the years, the IWT has come to emerge as a constraint imposed by India on itself; a self-dug grave. Given the current geopolitical tensions between India and Pakistan, adhering to the Treaty seems like tying our own hands. Keeping it in abeyance/suspension or even walking away from it permanently seem like options that would give India the flexibility it needs in such times of heightened conflict. But this seems easier said than done. As mentioned earlier, India may have to face serious backlash from international bodies, other nations as well as human rights groups in the form of charges of violating basic human rights by denying the Pakistani people access to a vital resource such as water. India is walking a very tight rope, trying to balance national security interests and global responsibility. Any action that India may take in this direction must be done with a careful, well-charted, and precise legal and diplomatic plan.
The recent turn of events serves as a stern reminder for India to not engage in any formal agreements/treaties with nations that have a proven track record of hostility and unreliability. Any more destructive actions by Pakistan could have a detrimental impact on India’s socio-economic developmental endeavours and act as a serious blow to public morale. Pakistan has consistently showcased its disregard for mutual trust and cooperation. Far from being a friend, it has always failed (sometimes even wilfully and with strategic intent) to uphold its commitments. India’s patience all along, hoping that things would change, has brought us nowhere; and today, we bear the dire consequences of this very avoidable optimism.
As a consequence of the deep erosion of trust, India’s stance today remains firm, asserting that it shall not engage in any dialogue with Pakistan unless it “irrevocably adjures its support for cross-border terrorism”. The weaponization of the IWT is a novel move and goes to show the changing face of exerting diplomatic pressure on enemy countries. While the IWT has been the cornerstone in managing water disputes between India and Pakistan, challenges do persist and the Treaty’s resilience will now hinge not just on procedural adherence, but also on continued dialogue, mutual trust and adherence to its established mechanism, contingent on the bilateral nature of these efforts.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The Indus Waters Treaty has historically functioned as a stabilizing diplomatic instrument, insulating water cooperation from broader political hostility. However, changing geopolitical realities, persistent cross-border terrorism, and evolving national security considerations have altered the calculus.
While suspension may offer short-term strategic leverage, it introduces legal ambiguity, environmental risks, and potential diplomatic isolation. Therefore, India’s approach must balance assertiveness with prudence.
Policy Suggestions and Action Points
1. Strategic Legal Framing: Any alteration to the implementation of the Treaty needs to be grounded in internationally defensible legal reasoning under the Vienna Convention framework.
2. Infrastructure Modernization: India should accelerate development of permissible storage and run-of-the-river projects within Treaty limits to maximize existing entitlements.
3. Hydrological Transparency Reform: Instead of abrupt suspension, recalibrate data-sharing frameworks to align with security concerns while avoiding complete breakdown of cooperation.
4. Re-negotiation Mechanism: Explore structured re-negotiation avenues focusing on climate change adaptation, disaster management, and equitable modernization of the Treaty framework.
5. Environmental Safeguards: Conduct rigorous environmental impact assessments to mitigate transboundary ecological damage from altered water flows.
6. Diplomatic Preparedness: Prepare a comprehensive diplomatic strategy anticipating multi-lateral scrutiny and framing actions within national security imperatives (Bhaumik, 2025).
On a closing note, the IWT represents both a diplomatic constraint and a strategic asset. Whether it continues as a stabilizing mechanism or evolves into a tool of calibrated pressure will depend on careful legal structuring, infrastructural readiness, and diplomatic foresight.
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