Abstract
The demand for the independence of Baluchistan is rooted in their past struggle during colonial period and even after independence. This struggle has led to the emergence of several Baloch nationalist organizations fighting for justice for Baluchistan. Their idea of justice spans from their concerns about the neglect of their development, absence of due representation in the governance, tactics of suppression used by the government of Pakistan, exploitation of the resources of Baluchistan, opposition to the involvement of China through CPEC and demand for separate state of Baluchistan. This struggle is more or less violent much closer to terror. Due to the label of terrorism they naturally lose legitimacy, are considered as internal security threats and invite military and punitive action against them.
However the Baloch threat to Pakistan's security has different shades. The finance, training, arms and ammunition and the logistic support received by Baloch insurgent groups cannot be without the outside support to the movement and also support from within Pakistan. The roots of the Baluch nationalist movement can be traced back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath. The links can be found between the cross-border threats from Afghanistan, the terrorist organizations operating within Pakistan and Baloch insurgent groups nationalist struggle. These threats are interwoven with several similarities in their objectives and operational strategies. This article tries to connect the dots between these factors against the canvas of the larger regional politics and internal politics of Pakistan.
Key words: Baluchistan, Baluch insurgency, Afghanistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban, Durand Line, Terrorism
Introduction
The demand for the independence of Balochistan has its roots in the colonial period and their struggle has continued after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Several Baloch nationalist organisations have emerged fighting for justice and rights for the people of Baluchistan. Baluchistan faces multiple issues such as the neglect of economic development, inadequate political representation in the governance structure of Pakistan, the use of coercive measures by the Pakistani state, and the exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources without proportional benefits to the local population. In recent years, opposition to China’s involvement in the region through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has raised concern. All these problems have culminated into the demand for independence of Baluchistan.
The Baluch separatist movement have often turned violent resorting to armed insurgency, attacks on Government institutions and leaders. Because of these strategies these movements are often equated with terrorism by the Government of Pakistan undermining their legitimacy. The Baluch separatist movements are framed as internal security threats that could be handled only through the military means.
The Baloch insurgency is a complex and multidimensional challenge to Pakistan’s security. The capacity of insurgent groups to acquire finance, training, weapons, and logistical support has been sustained because of assistance from both internal networks and external actors. This makes the Baloch movement not only a domestic political conflict but also an international conflict. The Baluchistan issue also has to be understood with reference to the regional dynamics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent militarisation of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, the development of cross border militant networks, the armed groups and fundamentalist forces within Pakistan are the overlapping developments. It is interesting to trace connections between cross-border militant networks operating in Afghanistan, various armed groups within Pakistan, and Baloch insurgent organisations in terms of their operational methods and strategic objectives. This article attempts to connect these different dimensions and situate the Baloch insurgency within the broader framework of regional geopolitics and Pakistan’s internal political dynamics.
Pakistan–Afghanistan Conflict and the Rise of TTP
Pakistan today faces a complex and multidimensional security crisis. Two major challenges operate simultaneously: an external security threat emerging from Afghanistan and an internal insurgency in Balochistan. The situation is further complicated by the presence of a third actor—Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—a militant organization operating along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border with connections to both the Afghan Taliban and militant networks within Baluchistan. These three powerful and interrelated forces significantly influence and destabilize Pakistan’s internal and external security equilibrium (Times of India, 2025).
The current tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan intensified after Pakistan launched airstrikes in Afghanistan in October 2025 targeting the leadership of the TTP, including its emir Noor Wali Mehsud. The TTP—often referred to as the Pakistani Taliban—was founded in 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud as an umbrella organization of militant groups operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The group emerged largely in response to Pakistan’s military operations against militants associated with Al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Since its formation, the TTP has carried out numerous suicide bombings and attacks targeting Pakistan’s military personnel, law-enforcement agencies, and civilians. The organization has been designated as a terrorist group by Pakistan as well as the United Nations.
Following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2021, large stockpiles of military equipment were left behind. Many of these weapons entered regional black markets through the porous Afghanistan–Pakistan border and became accessible to militant organizations including the TTP.
After the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan initially welcomed the new government in Kabul. Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan described the Taliban’s return as Afghans having “broken the shackles of slavery” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Pakistan expected the Afghan Taliban government to dismantle TTP networks operating from Afghan territory. The Taliban leadership refused to take decisive action against the group, which eventually contributed to growing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Finally the operation of October 2025 triggered retaliation by Afghan forces and led to a serious deterioration in relations between the two neighbouring countries.
Historical Roots of Pakistan–Afghanistan Strategic Relations
The origins of the Pakistan–Afghanistan security relationship can be traced back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the Cold War, the United States supported Afghan resistance fighters—known as the Mujahideen—through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This cooperation created a strategic alliance between the United States, Pakistan and Afghan resistance groups.
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, direct US involvement in Afghanistan declined, but Pakistan continued to play a major role in Afghan politics. During the 1990s, Pakistan’s intelligence establishment supported the emergence of the Afghan Taliban by providing logistical assistance, training and strategic guidance.
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban continued until the September 11 attacks, after which Pakistan joined the US-led Global War on Terror. Although Pakistan was officially allied with the United States and NATO forces, the Pakistani establishment continued to maintain covert links with Taliban networks.
During the period of US military presence in Afghanistan, US focused on dismantling Taliban networks operating along the Durand Line, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. As an ally of the US Pakistan also carried out military operations in these regions. US and Pakistani actions contributed to the radicalization of local militant groups and eventually led to the emergence of the TTP.
The Role of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)
The regional landscape was more complicated with the emergence of Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). ISKP emerged in 2015 in the background of instability created by the Syrian Civil War and the power vacuum in Iraq.
ISKP attracted defectors from the TTP, Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban who were dissatisfied with the Taliban’s nationalist orientation and its willingness to engage in diplomatic negotiations. Unlike the Taliban’s relatively localized agenda, ISKP promotes a transnational jihadist ideology and has been responsible for several sectarian attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
After the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, they launched operations against ISKP militants. As a result, many ISKP fighters got relocated across the Durand Line into Pakistan’s Balochistan, where ongoing political instability and insurgency created opportunities for militant networks to operate.
However, the ideological divide between ISKP and Baloch nationalist groups prevented deep cooperation. While Baloch insurgent organizations pursue a secular ethno-nationalist agenda seeking autonomy or independence, ISKP follows a radical Islamist ideology. As both Baluchistan and Afghanistan do not support ISKP, Pakistan being unhappy with both Afghanistan and Baluchistan started using ISKP against Baloch insurgents as well as Taliban.
Balochistan as a Strategic Militant Hub
During the US-led war in Afghanistan, Baluchistan became a hub for militants when several Taliban leaders took refuge in the provincial capital Quetta with Pakistani government's covert support. The Taliban leadership council—commonly referred to as the Quetta Shura—coordinated insurgent operations in southern Afghanistan from this location. However, Baloch nationalist movements strongly opposed Pakistan’s policy of sheltering Afghan Taliban networks in the province. Baloch leaders feared that the presence of religious militant groups would overshadow their secular nationalist struggle and the Pakistani government would use these networks to fight against Baluch insurgents.
Emerging Nexus Between TTP and Baloch Militancy
The Baloch insurgency is rooted in their ethno-nationalist demands whereas TTP believes in militancy and religious extremism. Despite significant ideological differences, tactical cooperation between the TTP and certain Baloch militant groups has gradually emerged in recent years. The shared hostility and pragmatism probably made them realise that their cooperation would enhance their operational capabilities.
In 2014, Pakistan’s military launched two major operations targeting militant bases of TTP. This weakened the organization and many militants fled to Afghanistan supporting the Afghan Taliban’s struggle against the US forces. To strengthen its base TTP planned to expand its influence beyond the Pashtun Belt and started reaching out to Baluch leaders. Initially ideological differences prevented the collaboration. But After 2018 TTP under the leadership of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, began to rebuild the alliance and the efforts were intensified after Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021. In 2022, several Baloch military commanders who had fought alongside Afghan Taliban got aligned with TTP which helped it with transportation routes and support network across Baluchistan. A number of Baloch groups led by figures such as Aslam Baloch, Mazar Baloch, Akram Baloch and Asim Baloch have reportedly joined the organization. The TTP has also started expanding its base in Baluchistan. It has established organizational structures in Baloch majority areas along the southern coast and Pashtun dominated areas near the Afghan border. It tries to integrate local militants into the broader insurgency campaign against Pakistan. For Baloch insurgent groups, extensive experience of TTP in guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings and use of explosives devices is of great advantage. They can now get trained and receive logistical support and resort to more sophisticated modern techniques in their operations. (Patro, 2023; Sayed, 2023).
Weapons Proliferation and Militant Networks After 2021
The withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2021 created a large-scale proliferation of weapons across the region. Arms left behind during the withdrawal quickly entered black markets controlled by organized criminal networks operating across the Afghanistan–Pakistan borderlands.
These networks facilitate arms trade and provide logistical support to militant organizations in exchange for financial benefits and protection. For many communities in border regions, participation in these illicit networks has become a source of livelihood.
Consequently, militant organizations such as the TTP and Baloch insurgent groups have gained access to modern weaponry and improved operational capabilities.
Strategic Importance of Balochistan and the CPEC Factor
Balochistan holds immense strategic importance for both Pakistan and China. Several major infrastructure projects associated with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) pass through the province, including highways, energy pipelines and the port of Gwadar. CPEC forms a central component of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative and is considered crucial for Pakistan’s economic development strategy.
However, many Baloch separatist groups view these projects as symbols of external exploitation of local resources. Consequently, CPEC infrastructure and Chinese personnel have increasingly become targets of militant attacks. For the TTP, attacking these projects also serves the strategic objective of weakening Pakistan’s economic and political stability.
Conclusion
The convergence of the Afghan Taliban, the TTP and Baloch insurgent groups has created an increasingly complex and dangerous security environment in Pakistan. The interaction of local grievances, cross-border militant networks and regional geopolitical competition has produced an interconnected insurgent landscape.
References:
Fair, C. Christine. 2014. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Oxford University Press.
International Crisis Group. 2022. Pakistan’s Balochistan Conflict: Prospects for Peace.
Patro, Bantirani. 2023. “An Emerging Nexus between the TTP and Baloch Militants.”
Rassler, Don. 2022. “The Pakistani Taliban after the Taliban’s Victory.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
Sayed, Abdul. 2023. “Pakistani Taliban Broaden Support Among Baloch, Merge With Separatist Groups.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation.
Council on Foreign Relations. 2023. “Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an Open War?”
