Abstract:
As with India’s rising military profile after the Operation Sindhoor across the border much interest has gone into how it develop its approach to military strategy and Joint Doctrine which will improve operational aspects and having impact at the strategic level. The concept of Joint Doctrine and Grand Strategy has got more attention after the recent Operation Sindhoor. Further, the focus on Jointness, Integration and Theatratization will be the logical step and in that context the focus on Joint Doctrine will go on a long way as a part of the Joint Operations will be conducted in future by the individual services in India. In terms of applied policy option, the above option of continental and maritime aspects translates into military means to get the political objectives. Further, it’s assumed to facilitate shifting India’s strategic orientation to have a maritime strategic thought is important as it will give enable the internal force structuring and externally it enables it to balance the existing delicate diplomacy India has to play between Washington and Beijing.
Keywords:Joint Doctrine, Theatre Command, Limited War, Grand Strategy
As with India’s rising military profile after the Operation Sindhoor across the border much interest has gone into how it develop its approach to military strategy and Joint Doctrine which will improve operational aspects and having impact at the strategic interest.1 To start with, it’s understood that Doctrine represents the available thought on the employment of forces that has been adopted by the nation’s armed force. In sum, Doctrine is a body of thought, and a knowledge-base which underpins the development of Grand strategy or politico-military strategy.
It’s expected that a working definition of strategy for the present purposes needs to keep in three main aspects. First, strategy involves relationships between ends (which are often thought of as policy aims) and means (which in this context are military resources of various sorts. If the military means are not explicated stated, then the government of the day believes are needed (including defense capabilities and the finances required to obtain them), it will not have done its job.2
Without a Doctrine, strategists would have to make decisions without a point of reference or guidance. Strategy, on the other hand, is an overall plan to move from the present situation to a desired goal in a given scenario. Its most critical attribute is that, it is set in the context of a given politico-military situation and within the ambit of an overall set of interests and objectives. Doctrine is evolved from government's policies. Strategy is derived from doctrine. If a strategy brings success, it reinforces the doctrine. If on the other hand it leads to failure, the doctrine is modified to achieve the laid down National interests and objectives.Strategy is the bridge between political ends and military means forming the essential link to the Grand Strategy.
As with India is contemplating its Grand Strategic approach the planning for the strategy and Joint Doctrine is carried out by the Service Headquarters of the three-armed forces and Headquarters, Integrated Defense Staff. The above conceptual has got more attention after the recent Operation Sindhoor. In terms of applied policy option, the above option of continental and maritime aspects translates into military means to get the political objectives. Further, it’s assumed to facilitated in shifting India’s strategic orientation to have a maritime strategic thought is important as it will give enable the internal force structuring and externally it enables it to balance the existing delicate diplomacy India has to play between Washington and Beijing. However, India has not come out explicitly in terms of how it will operationalize its Joint doctrine.3
As such one get the conceptual idea of Doctrine and Joint Doctrine from the joint doctrine released by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) of the Indian armed forces Indian armed forces (JDIAF-2017) in April 2017. This was not the first such document, a classified version having been circulated in 2006. It was, however, the first such extensive public statement of India’s approach to joint warfare.
Unlike some other countries, India does not publish a national security strategy or defence white paper that is made available for public scrutiny. Absent such a document, a public joint doctrine for the armed forces is perhaps the closest to an official articulation of Indian thinking on how various instruments of force combine to meet national security objectives
Though the term ‘militarily doctrine’ in itself should convey a common doctrine of all the three services of Army, Air Force and Navy together yet the word ‘joint’ has been added to emphasise the importance of attaining the aim of a common military perspective to achieve national and military objectives at the strategic and operational level.4
Earlier, The ‘Doctrine and concepts of Indian Army’ published in August 1998, devotes eleven pages to the theme of jointness but disposes of joint doctrine in three lines only. It states “From military strategy and objectives must flow a joint doctrine. This helps in providing unity of effort, and enhances coordination for joint planning, cooperation and mutual trust.The ‘Doctrine of Indian Air Force’ published in October 1995, is more apprehensive about the methodology that may be adopted for development of a joint doctrine rather than the philosophy behind evolving a joint doctrine.The single Service doctrines reflect the unique capabilities of the respective Service and give primacy to their own medium for conduct of warfare.5
Joint doctrine envisages an amalgamation of three media of battlespace, that is, land, air and sea and stresses on how best to integrate the three distinct forms of combat force into an effective force. In future the concept of space warfare might also be included. According to the Indian Air Force doctrine the ‘joint doctrine can be developed as a consequence of first having enunciated single service doctrine as a basis. Joint doctrine, therefore should not place limitations or conditions on the interpretation and application of single service doctrine.”
On the other hand, principles of war being followed by the Indian Armed Forces are the one’s which were evolved by the British based on their experience. Major Gen. JFC Fuller had cited seven principles of war during World War I for the training of British Armed Forces. In the light of experience gained during World War II, an additional three principles of war were added.
These principles of war, namely, selection and maintenance of aim, concentration of force, economy of effort, offensive action, security, surprise and deception, maintenance of morale, flexibility, cooperation and administration are universal principles common to all the three fighting services for conduct of warfare. These principles naturally would form the basis for development of a joint doctrine for our armed forces. The development of new technologies may affect the application of these principles of war, yet these principles continue to be truisms.
For instance the development of new weapon systems and the era of nuclear weapons has given rise to dispersion in the battlefield yet, when an offensive action has to be carried out the forces have to concentrate to overwhelm the adversary. The precision guided munitions fired from diverse platforms substitute mass for effects, thus continuing to validate the principle of concentration of force.
The common politico-diplomatic and military aim is to deter war. But should the deterrence fail, the armed forces have to prosecute war with a common aim and perspective. Almost all principles of war outlined above would be required to be applied jointly. The principle of economy of effort is not only closely inter-related with the unity of effort, but is also associated with concentrated application of force involving joint doctrine approach.6
This, logically, brings in inter-service cooperation, another principle of war, since diverse media and weapon systems would be used for achieving massed effects at the target end. Inter-service cooperation would encompass coordination of all military activities to achieve maximum synergetic effects against the adversary. Inter-Service cooperation is absolutely essential both during the planning and training process in peacetime and it is absolutely inescapable during a conflict. All these principles of war can be inter-woven and enmeshed together into a broad fabric of joint military doctrine that would provide a common direction and guidance to Indian armed forces.
The levels of a military doctrine are related to the levels of warfare that is strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. There is still a higher level of doctrine that is referred to as fundamental doctrine. This level of doctrine defines the nature of war, the purpose of military forces, the relationship of military force to other instruments of power.7 The Clausewitzian dictums that ‘War is continuation of policy by other means and war is an instrument of policy’, would fall into tenets, beliefs and principles of fundamental doctrine. Largely, such tenets may be insensitive to political ideologies or technological changes.
The three levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical action. There may not be distinct boundaries or rigid classifications between the three levels. The levels would usually be defined based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational or tactical objectives.
In India’s case endeavours to promote peace and deter aggression would be the hallmarks of the doctrine and in the event of failure of such attempts the military forces would fight and win. Therefore, conflict termination has to be properly conceptualised so that the military victories achieved do endure and appropriate political benefits are derived from it thus forming synergy between Operational and Strategic Level of Warfare.8
The strategic level of joint military doctrine would be principally concerned with common and joint planning processes, a joint vision, joint organisations for coordination and control, joint training, education and publications besides development of joint force structures and logistics to support them.
At the operational level joint military doctrine would deal with harmonising the capabilities of all the components of a joint force to exploit optimally the unique strength, role and mission of the single service components.It would include all doctrinal precepts to synchronise the action of land, air, maritime and Special Forces to achieve desired objectives. The goal of the doctrine would be to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force.9
At tactical level, the doctrine would boil down to evolving joint techniques, joint standard operating procedures for guiding the military operations at the tactical level. An example of this could be the procedure of calling for air support to ground operations or calling for naval gunfire support to sustain an amphibious task force. In the absence of a joint military doctrine the deployed forces would always find ways and means to overcome immediate obstacles to make things work. But this does not mean that parochial interests in the system have not been at work to preclude the development of a joint doctrinal guidance. In fact the Kargil experience reinforced the need for development of joint doctrine.10
Joint Doctrinal Interfaces in Indian Context
The single service doctrines of Army and Air Force would require to be interfaced to remove any dissonance and divergence on prosecution of war at various levels. Similarly, the maritime doctrine, which is also in an advanced stage of development, though not written down as a publication would also require to be interfaced and dovetailed with Army and Air Force doctrines for evolution of a joint services doctrine for the Indian Armed forces. However, due to different perspectives and differing service legacies, the single service doctrines reflect the respective service prejudices on strategy, operations and tactics. These at times, hinder the application of total force in a synergised manner. The absence of a well-articulated national security strategy and objectives further compound the problem.11
Land force’s view is generally constrained by what is happening in their immediate vicinity and is guided by the restricted reach of their surveillance and weapon systems. Although modern battlefield has extended depth to cover deep and rear battles yet it is constrained by terrain, natural and man-made obstacles and the type of mobility possessed by ground forces. The army men, therefore, become more concerned with all the military activities that have immediate impact on ground operations. This, perhaps is one of the major reasons for an unending debate on the merits of close air support and counter air operations.
The naval forces are not, generally, constrained by terrain factors though hydrography does have an impact on their mobility. The forces have to seek out and find the enemy fleet and engage it. Their problems may not be as immediate as that of land forces. The naval forces dominance of important choke points and control of sea lines of communications has its importance in relationship with geo-economics. The Kargil War showed that employment of naval forces does have an indirect impact on ongoing operations even if they are not involved directly in combat operations.
However, even in a joint service environment (more so in single-service environment) an air force’s principal objective is to fight the opponent’s air force; similarly, naval force would also like to seek out and destroy the opponent’s naval forces. The land forces in any case have to get on with the task of capturing and defending territory, requiring contribution from, at times, all the Services. It is widely accepted amongst our military planners and strategists that unless at the apex level there is a joint and integrated approach, the desired joint doctrine and synergy in planning and execution would not come about.12
Even in the US armed forces, their air doctrine tends to emphasise the wide-ranging flexibility of power deliverable from air-based platforms as the key ingredient for successful prosecution of war. Land warfare doctrine, on the other hand, usually assumes the ultimate need to exert some degree of control over the ground and tends to see air power as an useful, and at times even necessary supporting force in the performance of this ultimate mission.
In the Gulf War of 1991, Col. John Warden III of the US Air Force, who is considered to be the architect of air plan (code named ‘Instant Thunder'–reminiscent of and conceptually distinct from air operation ‘Rolling’ Thunder of Vietnam days), had designed the air war in classic sense that is, going after the enemy’s centres of gravity from the Air Force’s point of view.
The initial plan did not include the engagement of enemy’s fielded forces like destruction of Iraq’s elite force, Republican Guards. Little attention was paid to operations after the first seventy-two hours of the combat, and none to the support of eventual ground operations. Ground forces target other than those associated with command and control were not addressed.
The extensive air support given during Kargil operations contributed greatly in ensuring success of the land forces. The IAF is rightly, apprehensive of exposing costly multi-role aircrafts to the cheap hand held surface to air missiles, dense hostile air defence environment, and problems of acquisition and identification of targets by very fast moving aircrafts.
However, acquisition of precision guided munitions, laser guided designators, weapon systems with stand-off capabilities and better command, control and communication systems with in-built interoperability would, largely be able to overcome some of these problems. Perhaps, a suitable and cheaper aircraft for ground attack instead of a multi-role aircraft would give a better combat effectiveness value in the likely battlefield of future in the subcontinent. Close air support should be positively used to create and exploit opportunities in the battlefield since it can be most effective at the decisive points of the battlefield.
The IAF doctrine does accommodate to a large extent, the army’s viewpoint. The differing precepts are more in form rather than in substance. The air doctrine concludes that “In the doctrine of IAF the fight for control of the air or Air superiority gets first priority in every case without implying that it is for its own sake or that it alone would defeat the enemy. The air superiority battle is not done at the expense of support to surface forces since it is the achievement of requisite degree of control of air that makes roles like interdiction, Battlefield Air Interdiction and Close Air Support even more effective. It is, in fact not the attempt to achieve air superiority that causes dispersion of effort away from surface support, but the failure to do so.
A joint doctrine will coalesce, synthesise and harmonise the tenets, beliefs and principles of the different services into one common, officially enunciated and accepted guideline for carrying out joint operations and in Indian context it assumes more significance in context.
Air Force-Naval Doctrinal Interface in Indian Context
The naval doctrine though not enunciated in a separate publication as such does exist in some form or the other. Even the United States Navy does not have a separate doctrinal publication but its naval doctrine and precepts are reflected in a number of other naval publications.
Till the late sixties the development of the Indian Navy was influenced by the British. Lack of the political leadership’s assertiveness and difficulties in acquisition of naval systems also contributed to complexities in evolving a coherent Indian naval doctrine. There has been a continuous debate on what kind of maritime role would be desirable for the naval forces. This is indeed intimately connected with the national security doctrine and objectives. In the absence of a clear articulation of the overall doctrine the issues regarding the utility and non-utility of aircraft carriers for the Indian navy comes up. What kind of power projection capability is required commensurate with resources available or likely to be made available, has to be jointly planned and decided. In the absence of adequate resources, the priorities would have to be allotted for acquisition of joint warfare capabilities based on a common vision of the future nature of warfare and common perspective to achieve the war fighting objectives.
It is quite evident that IAF would be employed in close cooperation with Indian Naval forces to achieve optimum combat utility. Joint maritime air operations would exploit the natural synergies between air and naval forces. Though, the reach of shore-based air power would be restricted by its radii of operations yet this limitation can be overcome by aerial refueling capabilities. The tenets of gaining air superiority and carrying out counter air strikes are equally applicable while supporting naval forces. The IAF roles of anti-shipping strikes and maritime strikes are overlapping roles between the Navy and IAF. Even though, in the Indian context, detection and identification of maritime targets are the responsibility of the Navy, in a joint environment the IAF could supplement this effort.
The application of air power for maritime strikes, that is against enemy naval forces which are not in contact and enemy naval facilities on shore including naval platforms in harbour, would have to be jointly planned and coordinated. These maritime strikes would have to be planned with a view to not only further the naval operations but also for the furtherence of the overall objectives of a joint campaign.
Long-range maritime reconnaissance is the exclusive preserve of the Indian Navy but in certain contingencies it would be possible to employ resources available with the IAF for similar tasks. But this would require prior thought, that is, unified thinking, planning and coordination and this would go a long way in reinforcing and complementing joint efforts to attain military objectives. Further, if AWACS/AEW aircrafts become available the effectiveness and complementarity of joint maritime air operations would be greatly enhanced.
Tri-Service Doctrinal Interface in Indian Context
The Gulf War of 1991 is often cited as an example of application of joint doctrine developed by the US Armed Forces consequent to coming into force of Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986; a legislative mandate imposed upon the different Services to enforce jointness.
Amphibious operations are the acid test of jointness. It is the most complex operation of war requiring close cooperation and coordination among the participating forces of all the three services. The precepts of flexibility, mobility, and concentration of forces at the most advantageous point and at the most opportune moment become the essential considerations for successful conclusion of amphibious operations.
The capability and intent to use an amphibian force also serves as a threat in being in the overall context of theatre level joint operations. What should be our capability, is inexorably linked with our national security doctrine and objectives. Besides the defence of our own island territories the question is what kind of out of area or power projection capabilities do we need to have to protect our national interests.
However, there were different interpretations of the Gulf War by different Services and there were doctrinal differentials and disparities. Cooperation does not imply that all Services would have identical views on every issue, nor that they should be combined. Each service optimises its unique strengths.
The increasingly complex nature of warfare and induction of new technologies compels the Indian armed forces to fine-tune their doctrinal precepts in management of weapon systems and role that may be common to all or the two services and enunciation of the Joint Doctrine is the first step towards that when it comes to dealing with dual enmities China and Pakistan.13
The air defence weapon systems and air space management would require a detailed coordination and common perspective. The single service proclivities start making an appearance when overlapping areas of responsibility or similar weapon platforms are possessed by or bid for by two or more services.
For instance, induction of Prithvi missiles into the Army and Air Force is viewed differently by each Service. With the likelihood of induction of long range rocket systems like SMERCH into the Army and combined with the existing Prithvi missiles, there would be overlapping in interdiction roles. Needless to say that the emphasis has to be on joint planning, joint targeting and developing of common doctrine for shaping the battlefield. The air space over a modern battlefield with fast tempo and simultaneity would be very dense with flying objects like artillery fire, anti-aircraft fire, movement of own and enemy’s air and weapon platforms, various types of missiles and munitions. Thus management of air space would be an inter-services coordinated effort for smooth prosecution of war and for avoidance of fratricide.
In a post-industrial battlefield, it would be an astute combination of the ISR assets of all the three services which would provide a transparent, real time and a shared picture of the battlefield. In fact each single aspect, that is, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance lends itself for best exploitation jointly with common doctrinal guidance.
In the era of knowledge-age, information-based warfare, the single service doctrines are more likely to compound the ever-present Clausewitzian elements of battlefield ‘friction, fog and uncertainity’. The development of joint doctrine for the armed forces would be an attempt to attenuate the impact of these elements both during peace and war.
The use of scarce space based assets is another area which needs to be exploited jointly not only by the three services but also by civil agencies. Some planning and coordination appears to have been already done by nominating Army as the nodal agency for development of communications, Navy for space-based navigation and Air Force for carrying out surveillance with space-based assets. However, the optimal utilisation of space-based assets would be best executed by evolving joint tri-service doctrinal precepts.
Status of India’s Joint Doctrine
The formulation and process of evolving a military doctrine leave alone a joint military doctrine and introducing any innovation is riddled with many inherent inhibitors and obstacles. Military organisations, as a rule, are reluctant to change. They are used to structured and standard scenarios and standard operating procedures. It is a truism to state that ‘it is difficult to get a new idea into a military mind rather than get an old idea out’. The politico-military culture has pronounced proclivities for maintaining the status quo.
As the Kargil Review Committee Report points outed , Civilian bureaucrats perceive any move of integration of Services Headquarters with Ministry of Defence as a threat. And status quo is often mistakenly defended as civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not the real issue.
In pluralistic and democratic nation states, it has normally been a difficult task to forge a joint doctrine among the armed forces. In either a military dictatorship or a totalitarian regime such a problem may be resolved without much difficulty. Germany, under Hitler had been able to impart a common perspective to all the three services due to his undisputed authority. Many see Nazi Germany’s armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of ‘jointness’. The Wehrmacht did understand the value of synchronising its land, sea and airforces and Wehrmacht’s efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness.14
Even in the US Armed Forces, evolving a joint doctrine has not been an easy process. Before the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was thrust on the armed forces, there had been official agreements between the different services to resolve common issues of concern to them. In November 1984, the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) Joint Service Agreement was signed by the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff, and in December 1984, the J-SAK Procedures Manual was published.
These documents put across an early vision of how air and land forces would jointly conduct modern warfare.
The Indian Armed Forces modest attempts for evolving a joint doctrine started in mid-nineties with the establishment of Army Training Command on the lines of a similar organisation established by the US. Even after a number of years of debate, it is not clear as to which agency should be made responsible for writing such a joint doctrine. Though, the appropriate authority for issuing a direction for evolving a joint doctrine would wrest with the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), the obvious choice for writing and coordinating such a doctrine would be Joint Planning Committee (JPC).15
However, JPC is inadequately staffed. The other choices of agencies for writing such a doctrine are Director General Defence Planning Staff (DGDPS) and Army Training Command (ARTRAC). Both Air Force and Navy have officers of the rank of Air Commodore and Commodore posted at ARTRAC and ARTRAC could be earmarked as a nodal agency for development of joint doctrine.
There have been a number of seminars held between the Army and Air Force to resolve issues of concern to the respective services. And there has been considerable convergence on issues of joint planning, joint targeting and tasking. The guiding principles of this convergence are that the Army would not find itself deficient of air power for conduct of its operations.16
After Kargil, the media has been very active in reporting joint training exercises being carried out by the armed forces. All these exercises are aimed at honing joint skills. The Indian Navy conducted exercise ’springex’ in the Arabian Sea
The exercise involved elements of both Western and Eastern Naval Fleets and was planned to culminate in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with a tri-services operation. In the final phase, an amphibious landing was carried out by the Army. The experience gained during such exercises would be useful in evolving a joint doctrine.
The scope of this exercise encompassed planning of an offensive of an integrated task force against the backdrop of the prevailing security situation in the subcontinent. Its aim was to integrate air power with ground forces for delivering a decisive punch. The aim of such exercises is not only to test the combat elements of each service, but such exercises become facilities for evolving a common perspective of the battlefield.
Finally, where does the joint doctrinal developmental process stand today? It is believed that such issues are to be tackled as an aftermath of exercise ‘Brahmastra’ held in May 2025.The main purpose of this effort was to evolve doctrinal precepts to meet the battlefield requirements of the 21st century. The stress was on interservice operations, theme of jointness and efforts to achieve greater cohesion in all facets of functioning of the three Services. As an outcome of the deliberations held during the tri-service exercises (some papers have referred to it as a conference) a number of studies on joint planning processes may be ordered. And one such study could be for evolving a joint doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces.
The establishment of the National Security Council in November 1998 had given an indication that a strategic defence review would be carried out and perhaps a national security doctrine would be formulated in an earlier time frame. The Kargil Review Committee Report released in 1999 has pointed out flaws in the national security decision-making process and the desirability of achieving integration of the Services Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. However, whatever be the outcome of recommendations of the Kargil Report, there is considerable scope amongst the three Services of the Indian Armed Forces to achieve jointness and integration and as a consequence gain synergies in the defence of the realm.
One such essential element of jointness is evolution of a joint doctrine for the armed forces. The battlefields of the future are becoming increasingly complex. A joint doctrine will glue the joint forces together in the battlespace of the future. Single service doctrines have unique proclivities in practice of warfare. At the beginning, the attempts to move towards a common perspective may appear to be difficult to achieve or the inter-service problems may seem intractable. However, such problems are not insurmountable.
Joint doctrine is intimately connected with principles of war commonly accepted by all the three Services. Unity of effort, economy of effort, common objectives and goals at all levels of war compel them to evolve a common doctrine for warfighting. The uniqueness, strengths, capabilities and limitations of each service have to be appreciated by all members of a joint team. Proficiency in own service is basic to jointness and everything else flows out from this fundamental requirement.
While there are numerous inhibitors for development of a joint doctrine yet there are adequate facilitators for evolving such a doctrine. One can only hope that a national disaster should not become a facilitator for such a purpose. With a number of joint planning and training exercises having been held in the aftermath of Kargil and experience of past wars it is time to put our beliefs, experiences and tenets of warfighting into writing. All the three services have one common aim, that is, to deter war and should the deterrence fail, to fight and win.
India’s Strategic Doctrine and limited war concept
The clarification on the politico-military orientation and the Grand Strategy is achieved with the perceived articulation of the Strategic Doctrine. The Strategic Doctrine guides the Grand Strategy and the military doctrine. India’s Joint Warfare Doctrine released in April 2017 spelt out the concept of Grand Strategy or the Strategic Doctrine and the higher defense organization required for that.
On that note, The Indian higher defense organization has retained the structure it had shortly after independence in August 1947. After the intelligence failure of the Kargil War in 1999, there were calls for defense reform. This led to the creation of two experimental commands, one functional (Strategic Forces Command), and one theater (Andaman and Nicobar Command).
While the development of further theater commands has stagnated, there have been persistent rumors over the imminent formation of three functional commands: Space, Cyber, and Special Forces. India’s joint doctrine refers to these in the section called “Integrated Strategic Structures: Emerging Triad.” This perhaps lays the groundwork for the future establishment of these commands. The Doctrine makes the case that integration of these functions is necessary modeling on the United States approach to development of joint doctrine.
There are, however, some differences from the U.S. approach to doctrine development amd integration. For example, U.S. joint doctrine normally explains its relationship to service doctrine: joint doctrine supersedes service doctrine. Indian joint doctrine merely aligns with service doctrine. One classic example is that India claims that it’s Army’s military doctrine has moved to a ‘proactive’ and ‘offensive’ doctrine from the start of this century.
The Indian Army doctrine released in 2004 has been popularly dubbed ‘Cold Start’. The 2004 Indian Army Doctrine is updated every five years. The Indian Army doctrine has two parts. Part I is accessible and unclassified while the Part II is inaccessible and classified. It’s the Part II which has been dubious since Pakistan claims that Part II is the so called “Cold Start” 17
Following the release of the Army Doctrine, a classified Joint Warfare Doctrine, was formulated by the Head Quarters International Defence Staff (HQIDS) in 2006. Joint Warfare Doctrine includes the doctrine of three services of Army, Navy and Air Force. Air Force has its own doctrine which’s classified, however the Naval Doctrine the so called ‘India’s Maritime Doctrine’ is not. Then there is a sub-conventional warfare doctrine classified Joint Warfare doctrine, formulated by HQs Integrated Defence Staff of 2006. The Air Force doctrine is also classified, but not so the Naval doctrine, expansively termed ‘India’s Maritime Doctrine’ which was released in 2009.
These four doctrines would serve as guide for conventional conflict strategy. Response to terror provocations emanating from Pakistan, such as in the form of ‘surgical strikes’ and action on the Line of Control, would be subsumed in the Sub-conventional portion of the spectrum of armed conflict.
With respect to China in terms of continental approach, India doesn’t have any such concrete doctrines therefore leaving void in it’s approach to Grand Strategic orientation. On the other hand, thought theoretically, the concept of Grand Strategy has evolved into a type of policymaking process rather than an independent theoretical idea it’s understood that in India’s case at present it doesn’t not having an independent theoretical idea on the concept of Grand Strategy.
Further, India’s strategic doctrine has not clearly mentioned either the nuclear strategy or the limited war theory concept. The Indian Army Doctrine (2004) has no discussion of limited war. What the new 2010 edition of the doctrine states in this respect is not known since, unlike its 2004 predecessor document, it is confidential.
On that note, it brings one to the issue of doctrinal formulation and promulgation in India. The absence of a Chief of Defense Staff leads to each service formulating and promulgating respective doctrine on its own. While admittedly this would be after due formal and informal networking with other services, yet organizational theory informs that this cannot be without the contaminating element of inter-service rivalry.
This is part of periodic updation of the doctrine of 2004 being conducted by the Army Training Command. As mentioned in the preface to the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine by the then Army Commander, ‘Part I will be reviewed every five years and updated, as necessary.’ This ‘main part’ was earlier accessible on the Army’s website; but is now available on the website of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. The second part is classified and is only for restricted circulation. As a whole, the doctrine is to be re-issued every ten years.18
Interestingly, the Cold Start strategy does not find mention in Part I and can be presumed to have been dwelt within the restricted Part II. In effect, both parts are likely being dealt with in the ongoing review, though only the revised Part I would be placed in the public domain eventually. The success of India's war strategy, entailing orchestrated exercise military and non-military power, will be predicated on avoidance of this eventuality. However, in case of a more expansive conflict, a nuclear doctrinal shift from ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation will be the recognition of the continuing need for limitation despite nuclearization of a conflict.
As with India has recently released its Joint warfare doctrine and earlier the maritime security strategy document where the concept of Grand Strategy has been discussed, it’s imperative that there will be discussions on its evolving approach with respect to it’s strategic and doctrine.19
On the other hand, it’s true notwithstanding the internal discussion on strategy and doctrine it gives an important paradigm in India’s maritime thinking which is more important to it’s strategic partners and allies. The central focus is on improving its strategic outreach in the Asia-Pacific region, while also securing its maritime flank in the Indo-Pacific region. This would be done in co-operation with other maritime powers, so sharing collectively in their efforts to keep the Sea Lines of Communication open
In other words, rather than pursuing the offensive continental strategy towards China also, the argument put forward is to pursue a maritime strategy which involves forming alliances among countries which are wary of Beijing’s increased maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the other hand, the logic to raise the mountain strike corps was based on this as India being primarily a continental strategic orientated country with a democratic political system in which the lost of territories will be considered volatile the move to raise a strike corps oriented towards China is more of a consideration given to reasons related to politico-military aspect rather than a economic aspect involving strategy.
The above two arguments brings to the table the problem of how India could operationalize its strategy in different theatres which brings questions at a Grand Strategy level. It extends to the fact that can India in addressing its immediate land based threat in its core can shelve its much acceptable role of expanding presence in its periphery in the South-East Asia or Indo-Pacific region by increasing its blue-water capabilities or the other way around.
India’s strategic orientation towards China with developing its offensive maritime capabilities has increased with adding more strength to India’s Eastern Naval Command based in Vishakapatnam and strengthen its tri-command service in the Andamans and Nicobar Islands and the now is the time to develop its land based capabilities by adding the mountain strike corps.
In conclusion,
It’s understood that Post Sindhoor operation, India has gone on an overdrive to develop it’s military capabilities to negate threats from across border. However, the focus on Jointness, Integration and Theatratization will be the logical step and in that context the focus on Joint Doctrine will go on a long way as a part of the Joint Operations will be conducted in future by the individual services in India.
Notes:
1) Operation Sindoor: India’s Military Doctrine of Offensive Defence( DD News, June 1, 2025) https://ddnews.gov.in/en/operation-sindoor-indias-military-doctrine-of-offensive-defence/
2) Peter Layton Book Review: The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought by Lukas Milevski The RUSI Journal, Vol 161, Issue 5 December 2016 pp 92-93.
3) Rahul Singh India releases 3 joint doctrines for armed forces ( Hindustan times, August 28,2025) https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-releases-3-joint-doctrines-for-armed-forces-101756330629577.html
4) India releases joint military doctrines for special forces, airborne ops and multi-domain warfare (Tribune, August 27,2025) https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/india-releases-joint-military-doctrines-for-special-forces-airborne-ops-and-multi-domain-warfare/
5) ‘Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy’, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, pp. 2-8. Freedom to use seas” India’s Maritime Military Strategy Integrated Defense Headquarters 2007
6) Partick Bratton and David Smith India’s Joint Doctrine : Hopeless Muddle, or the start of the Strategic articulation? June 8, 2017 War Room Army War College https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/indias-joint-doctrine-hopeless-muddle-start-strategic-articulation/
7) Headquaters Integrated Defence Staff Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf
8) Major General (Dr) SB Asthana, SM, VSM (Retd)Application of Operational Art in Operation Sindoor Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLV, No. 641, July-September 2025 https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI_Journal_July_Sept_2025_Issue_17_28.pdf
9) Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force ( PIB, May 14, 2025) https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2128748
10) Brig. G.D. Bakshi, VSM Operational Art in the Indian Context: An Open Sources Analysis Monthly Journal of the IDSA September 2001 (Vol. XXV No. 6) https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_sep01bag01.html
11) Lt General General V K Kapoor An Operational Perspective of Network Centric Warfare from and Indian Perspective ( Journal of the USI January-March 2006) https://usiofindia.org/pdf/Jan-Mar-2006-part-8.pdf
12) Vinod Anand Evolution of a Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces ( IDSA Strategic Analysis, July 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 4) ) https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_jul00anv01.html
13) BalajiChandramohan China Factor in Operation Sindoor: Operational and Strategic Lessons for India ( Centre for China Studies, June 1, 2026) https://mailchi.mp/64f6e30ea7f7/c3s-china-watch-june-01-15-2025
14) James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 254
15) Ali Ahmed A Perspective on Land Warfare StrategyCLAWS Journal l Winter 2009 pp 218- 225 Colonel Ali Ahmed The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy ( IDSA, September 28,2010)
16) V.R. RAGHAVAN Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia TheNonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2001
17) Ali Ahmed (2012). Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine. Comparative Strategy, 31(5), 453–468. https://www.ipcs.org/ipcs_books_selreviews.php?recNo=244
18) Ali Ahmed, ‘The Sino-Pak ‘collusive’ threat’, CLAWS Article 1794, 31 March 2011, http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=795&u_id=77
19) John Kiszely. “Thinking about the Operational Level”, RUSI Journal 150/6 (2005), 38. William F. Owen. “The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist”, The Journal of Military Operations 1/1 (Summer 2012), 18, 20.
20) Clausewitz, On War, 595
